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Abstract
Solving for adversarial examples with projected
gradient descent has been demonstrated to be
highly effective in fooling the neural network
based classifiers. However, in the black-box
setting, the attacker is limited only to the query
access to the network and solving for a successful
adversarial example becomes much more difficult.
To this end, recent methods aim at estimating the
true gradient signal based on the input queries but
at the cost of excessive queries. We propose an
efficient discrete surrogate to the optimization
problem which does not require estimating the
gradient and consequently becomes free of the
first order update hyperparameters to tune. Our
experiments on Cifar-10 and ImageNet show the
state of the art black-box attack performance
with significant reduction in the required queries
compared to a number of recently proposed
methods. The source code is available at
https://github.com/snu-mllab/
parsimonious-blackbox-attack.
1. Introduction
Understanding the vulnerability of neural network based
classifiers to adversarial perturbations (Szegedy et al., 2013;
Carlini et al., 2016) designed to fool the classifier predictions
have emerged as an important research area in machine
learning. Recent studies have devised highly successful
attacks in the white-box setting (Goodfellow et al., 2014;
Madry et al., 2017; Carlini & Wagner, 2017), where the
attacker has access to the network model parameters and
the corresponding loss gradient with respect to the input
perturbation.
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However, in more realistic settings (Watson visual recogni-
tion, 2019; Google vision API, 2019; Clarifai API, 2019),
the attacker is limited to the access of input queries and
the corresponding model predictions. These web services
offer various commercial recognition services such as im-
age classification, content moderation, and face recognition
backed up by pretrained neural network based classifiers. In
this setting, the inference network receives the query image
from the user and only exposes the inference results, so the
model weights are hidden from the user.
To this end, black-box methods construct adversarial pertur-
bations without utilizing the model parameters or the gradi-
ent information. Some recent works on black-box attacks
compute the gradient using a substitute network (Papernot
et al., 2016; 2017) but it has been shown that the method
does not always transfer to the target network. On the other
hand, another line of works aim at estimating the gradient
based on the model predictions from the input queries and
apply first order updates with the estimated gradient vector
(Chen et al., 2017; Tu et al., 2018; Bhagoji et al., 2018; Ilyas
et al., 2018a;b). However, the robustness of this approach
can be susceptible to the choice of the hyperparameters such
as the learning rate, decay rates, and the update rule since
the performance of the method hinges on the first order
updates with approximated ascent directions.
We first consider a discrete surrogate problem which finds
the solution among the vertices of the `∞ ball and show
that this unlocks a new class of algorithms which constructs
adversarial perturbations without the need to estimate the
gradient vector. This comes with the benefit that the algo-
rithm becomes free of the update hyperparameters and thus
is more applicable in black-box settings. Intuitively, our
proposed method defines and maintains upper bounds on
the marginal gain of attack locations, and this leads to a
parsimonious characteristic of the algorithm to terminate
quickly without having to perform excessive queries.
Our results on Cifar-10 (Krizhevsky & Hinton, 2009) and
ImageNet (Russakovsky et al., 2015) show the state of the
art attack performance under `∞ noise constraint demon-
strating significantly higher attack success rates while mak-
ing considerably less function queries compared to the re-
cent baseline methods (Chen et al., 2017; Tu et al., 2018;
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Ilyas et al., 2018a;b) in both the untargeted and targeted
black-box attack settings. Notably, our method achieves
attack success rate comparable to the white-box PGD attack
(Madry et al., 2017) in some settings (attacks on the adver-
sarially trained network on Cifar-10), although the method
uses more queries being a black-box attack method.
2. Related works
There has been a line of work on adversarial attacks after the
recent discovery of network vulnerability to the attacks from
Biggio et al. (2012); Szegedy et al. (2013). In our paper, we
focus on black-box attacks under `∞ constraint with access
to the network prediction scores only. Although attacks on
more limited settings (access to the network decision only)
have been explored (Brendel et al., 2017; Ilyas et al., 2018a;
Cheng et al., 2018), the methods typically require up to
1M queries per images which can be difficult to apply in
practical settings.
Black-box attacks with substitute networks Papernot
et al. (2016; 2017) utilize separate substitute networks
trained to match the prediction output of the target net-
work similar to model distillation (Hinton et al., 2015). The
idea then is to craft adversarial perturbations by using the
backpropagation gradients from the substitute network and
transfer the adversarial noise to the target network. The
follow-up work from Liu et al. (2016) showed that black-
box attacks with substitute networks tend not to transfer
well for targeted attacks but can be improved with ensemble
networks. However, the attack success rates for these meth-
ods are outperformed by another line of techniques which
directly estimate the gradient of the target network based on
the input queries.
Black-box attacks with gradient estimation Chen et al.
(2017) computes the coordinate-wise numerical gradient of
the target network by repeatedly querying for the central
difference values at each pixels per each ascent steps. This
can be prohibitive as it would require approximately half
million queries on moderate sized images. Bhagoji et al.
(2018) mitigates the issue by grouping the pixels at random
or via PCA but still requires computing the group-wise
numerical gradients per each ascent steps.
In contrast, Ilyas et al. (2018a); Tu et al. (2018) compute
the vector-wise gradient estimate with random vector ui by
computing 1σn
∑n
i (f(x+σui)−f(x−σui))ui. Ilyas et al.
(2018b) extends the approach to incorporate time-dependent
prior which acts similar to the momentum term (Nesterov,
1983) in first order optimization and data-dependent prior
which exploits the spatial regularity (also in Tu et al. (2018))
for query efficiency.
3. Methods
Suppose we have a classifier with a corresponding loss
function `(x, y). In black box attacks, the goal is to craft im-
perceptible adversarial perturbations (xadv) typically under
small `∞ radius in a limited query budget. Furthermore, the
attacker only has access to the loss function (zeroth order
oracle). This is a challenging setup as the attacker does not
have access to the gradient information (first order oracle)
with respect to the input.
3.1. Problem formulation
First order methods tend to have strong attack performance
by formulating a constrained optimization problem and
querying the gradient of the loss with respect to the input
perturbation. Fast gradient sign method (FGSM) (Good-
fellow et al., 2014) first derives the following first order
Taylor approximation to the loss function. Note, PGD is a
multi-step variant of FGSM (Madry et al., 2017).
`(xadv, y) ≈ `(x, y) + (xadv − x)ᵀ∇x`(x, y)
Then, the optimization problem becomes,
maximize
‖xadv−x‖∞≤
`(xadv) =⇒ maximize
xadv
xadv
ᵀ∇x`(x, y) (1)
subject to − 1  xadv − x  1,
where 1 denotes the vector of ones,  denotes the element-
wise inequality. Thus, we can interpret FGSM as finding the
solution to the above linear program (LP) in Equation (1)
with the gradient vector evaluated at the original image x
as the cost vector in LP. Similarly, we can interpret that
PGD sequentially finds the solution to the above LP at each
step with the updated gradient vector ∇xadv`(xadv, y) as
the cost vector.
Since the feasible set in Equation (1) is bounded, the solu-
tion of the LP is attained at an extreme point of the feasible
set (Schrijver, 1986), and we can theoretically characterize
that an optimal solution will be attained at a vertex of the `∞
ball. Figure 1 shows an example statistics of the adversarial
noise (xadv − x) obtained by running the PGD algorithm
until convergence on Cifar-10 dataset. This shows that the
empirical solution from PGD is mostly found on vertices
of `∞ ball as well. We also found that running PGD un-
til convergence on ImageNet dataset also produces similar
results.
This characterization together with the fact that in many re-
alistic scenarios, the access to the true gradient is not readily
available, motivates us to consider a discrete surrogate to
the problem as shown in Equation (2).
maximize
xadv∈Rp
f(xadv) =⇒ maximize
xadv
f(xadv) (2)
subject to ‖xadv − x‖∞ ≤  subject to xadv − x ∈ {,−}p,
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where p denotes the number of pixels in the image x, f(x) =
`(x, ygt) for untargeted attacks with ground truth label ygt,
and f(x) = −`(x, ytarget) for targeted attacks with target
label ytarget.
Optimizing the discrete surrogate problem does not require
estimating the gradient and thus removes all the hyperpa-
rameters crucial for gradient update based attacks (Ilyas
et al., 2018a;b; Chen et al., 2017; Tu et al., 2018). Further-
more, we show in Section 3.4 how the surrogate exploits the
underlying problem structure for faster convergence (early-
termination in black-box attacks).
Equivalently, the discrete problem in Equation (2) can be
reformulated as the following set maximization problem in
Equation (3).
maximize
S⊆V
{
F (S) , f
(
x+ 
∑
i∈S
ei − 
∑
i/∈S
ei
)}
, (3)
where ei denotes the i-th standard basis vector, V de-
notes the ground set which is the set of all pixel locations
(|V| = p), S denotes the set of selected pixels with + per-
turbations, and V \ S indicates the set of remaining pixels
with − perturbations. The goal in Equation (3) is to find
the set of pixels S with + perturbations (and vice versa for
V \ S) which will maximize the objective function. How-
ever, finding the exact solution to the problem is NP-Hard
as naïve exhaustive solution requires combinatorial (2|V|)
queries. Subsequent subsections discuss how we exploit the
underlying problem structure for efficient computation.
3.2. Approximate submodularity
In general, maximizing functions over sets is usually NP-
hard (Krause & Golovin, 2014; Bach et al., 2013). However,
many set functions that arise in machine learning problems
often exhibit submodularity.
Definition 1. For a set function F : 2V → R,S ⊆ V, and
e ∈ V , let ∆(e | S) := F (S ∪{e})−F (S) be the marginal
gain (Krause & Golovin, 2014) of F at S with respect to e.
Definition 2. A function F : 2V → R is submodular if for
every A ⊆ B ⊆ V and e ∈ V \ B it holds that
∆(e | A) ≥ ∆(e | B)
Intuitively, submodular functions exhibit a diminishing re-
turns property where the marginal gain diminishes as the
augmenting set size increases. In the context of machine
learning problems, the implication of submodularity is that
we can efficiently compute an approximately optimal solu-
tion to the submodular set functions with a suite of greedy
style algorithms. Furthermore, submodularity allows us to
establish (1− 1e )-approximation (Nemhauser et al., 1978)
for monotone submodular functions and 13 -approximation
(Feige et al., 2011) for non-monotone submodular functions.
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Figure 1. Distribution of ad-
versarial noise with white
box PGD attack on Cifar-10
dataset with wide Resnet w32-
10 adversarially trained net-
work at `∞ ball radius  = 8
in [0, 255] scale.
0 20 40 60 80 100
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Image index
(sorted by f(·)− f(xpgd))
f
(·)
−
f
(x
p
g
d
)
xls
xg
Figure 2. f(·) − f(xpgd) val-
ues on random 100 samples on
the same experiment setting as
Figure 1, where xls, xg and
xpgd each denotes image per-
turbed by local search, greedy
insertion, and PGD method.
Unfortunately, we can construct a counterexample showing
F (S) is not submodular. Let f(x) = − log
(
1
1+e−wᵀx
)
,
w = (−1,−1)ᵀ,  = 1, and x = (0, 0)ᵀ. For A = ∅, B =
{1}, and e = 2 the inequality on Definition 2 does not
hold because 0.57 = ∆(e | A) < ∆(e | B) = 1.43,
which implies F (S) is not submodular. Regardless, if the
submodularity is not severely deteriorated (Zhou & Spanos,
2016), submodular maximization algorithms still work to a
substantial extent. Figure 2 shows the result of running local
search (Feige et al., 2011) and greedy insertion (Krause &
Golovin, 2014) in comparison to the function value of the
solution obtained by white box PGD method on Cifar-10
dataset. The plots show that greedy insertion solution, in
general, has comparable objective value to PGD solution
and that local search solution shows slightly higher value
than PGD solution.
For non-monotone set functions, local search type algo-
rithms achieve better theoretical and practical solutions than
greedy insertion algorithms by providing modifications to
the working set with alternating insertion and deletion pro-
cesses. In the following subsection, we establish the approx-
imation bound for performing improved local search proce-
dure for non-monotone approximate submodular functions
and then propose an accelerated variant of the algorithm
for practical black-box adversarial attack. We first make a
slight detour and introduce the local search procedure and a
proof of local optimality.
3.3. Local search optimization for black-box attack on
approximately submodular functions
Local search algorithm (Feige et al., 2011) alternates be-
tween greedily inserting an element while the marginal gain
is strictly positive (∆(e | S) > 0) and removing an ele-
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ment while the marginal gain is also strictly positive. Feige
et al. (2011) showed that once the algorithm converges it
converges to a local optimum of the set function F . When
the set function is submodular, the local search solution has
1
3 -approximation with respect to the optimal solution.
Definition 3. Given a set function F , a set S is a local
optimum, if F (S) ≥ F (S\{a}) for any a ∈ S and F (S) ≥
F (S ∪ {a}) for any a /∈ S.
Lemma 1. Let S be the solution obtained by performing
the local search algorithm. Then S is a local optima.
Proof. See supplementary A.1.
Note that Lemma 1 holds regardless of submodularity. The
following theorem states an approximation bound for the
local search solution for approximately submodular set func-
tions. Note, we assume non-negativity1 of the set function
for the proof.
Theorem 1. Let C be an optimal solution for a function F
and S be the solution obtained by the local search algorithm.
Then,
2F (S) + F (V \ S) ≥ F (C) + ξλF (V, 2),
where
ξ =
(
|S \ C|
2
)
+
(
|C \ S|
2
)
+ |S ∪ C| · |S|+ |C \ S| · |S ∩ C|
Proof. See supplementary A.2.
Finally, from Theorem 2, we get the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If F (C)+ξλF (V, 2) ≥ 0, one of the following
holds
1. F (S) ≥ 13
(
F (C) + ξλF (V, 2)
)
2. F (V \ S) ≥ 13
(
F (C) + ξλF (V, 2)
)
As the set function becomes submodular, the submodularity
index (λF ) becomes close to zero (Zhou & Spanos, 2016),
recovering the 13 -approximation bound (Feige et al., 2011).
From the local search algorithm, we obtain a set S of pixels
to perturb the input image xwith + and the complement set
V \S of pixels to perturb with−. Concretely, the perturbed
image is computed as xadv , x+ 
∑
i∈S ei − 
∑
i/∈S ei.
Figure 3 shows some examples of the perturbed images
produced by the algorithm.
1A standard trick in discrete optimization is to add a constant
offset term to the set function.
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Figure 3. Adversarial examples from ImageNet in the targeted
setting. The top row shows the original images and the bottom row
shows the corresponding perturbed images from our method.
3.4. Acceleration with lazy evaluations
Naïvely applying the local search algorithm (Feige et al.,
2011) for black-box adversarial attack poses a challenge
because each calls to the greedy insertion or deletion algo-
rithms make O(|V| · |S|) queries (since at each step greedy
algorithm finds the element that maximizes the marginal
gain) and would become impractical for query limited black-
box attacks which we are interested in.
Algorithm 1 Lazy Greedy Insertion
input Objective set function F , Working set S, Ground set V
initialize Max heap Q = ∅
1: for each element e ∈ V \ S do
2: Calculate ∆(e | S) := F (S ∪ {e})− F (S)
3: Push (e,∆(e | S)) into Q
4: end for
5: while |Q| > 0 do
6: Pop the top element eˆ from Q, update its upper bound ρ(eˆ)
7: Peek the top element e˜ and its upper bound ρ(e˜) in Q
8: if ρ(eˆ) > ρ(e˜) and ρ(eˆ) > 0 then
9: S ← S ∪ {eˆ}
10: else if ρ(eˆ) > ρ(e˜) and ρ(eˆ) ≤ 0 then
11: break
12: else
13: Push (eˆ, ρ(eˆ)) into Q
14: end if
15: end while
output S;
Thus, we employ the accelerated greedy algorithm often
called Lazy-Greedy (Minoux, 1978). Instead of computing
the marginal gain ∆(e | Si) for each item e ∈ V \ Si at
each iteration i + 1, the algorithm keeps an upper bound
ρ(e) on the marginal gain for each item in a max-heap. In
each iteration i + 1, it evaluates the marginal gain for the
top element eˆ in the heap and updates the upper bound
ρ(eˆ) := ∆(eˆ | Si). If ρ(eˆ) ≥ ρ(e) ∀e, then submodularity
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guarantees that eˆ is the element with the largest marginal
gain. If the top element does not satisfy this condition, the
algorithm inserts it again into the heap with the updated
upper bound.
While the number of function evaluations in the worst case
is the same as the standard greedy algorithm, the algorithm
provides several orders of magnitude speedups in practice
(Leskovec et al., 2007; Gomez-Rodriguez et al., 2012; Lin &
Bilmes, 2011; Wei et al., 2013; Mirzasoleiman et al., 2013).
Note, however, if strict upper bound on function evalua-
tion is required, another variant, Stochastic-Greedy (Mirza-
soleiman et al., 2015) offers a stochastic algorithm with
linear time upper bound on function evaluations (|V| log 1θ ).
Algorithm 2 Lazy Greedy Deletion
input Objective set function F , Working set S
initialize Max heap Q = ∅
1: for each element e ∈ S do
2: Calculate ∆−(e | S) := F (S \ {e})− F (S)
3: Push (e,∆−(e | S)) into Q
4: end for
5: while |Q| > 0 do
6: Pop the top element eˆ from Q, update its upper bound ρ(eˆ)
7: Peek the top element e˜ and its upper bound ρ(e˜) in Q
8: if ρ(eˆ) > ρ(e˜) and ρ(eˆ) > 0 then
9: S ← S \ {eˆ}
10: else if ρ(eˆ) > ρ(e˜) and ρ(eˆ) ≤ 0 then
11: break
12: else
13: Push (eˆ, ρ(eˆ)) into Q
14: end if
15: end while
output S;
Algorithm 3 Accelerated Local Search w/ Lazy Evaluations
input Objective set function F , Working set S, Ground set V
1: for t = 1, . . . ,MAXITER do
2: Insert elements of V into S using Algorithm 1
S ← LAZYGREEDYINSERTION(F,S,V)
3: Delete elements from S using Algorithm 2
S ← LAZYGREEDYDELETION(F,S)
4: end for
output argmax
A∈{S,V\S}
F (A);
The resulting algorithm for performing local search opti-
mization with lazy evaluations is presented in Algorithm 3.
The lazy insertion and deletion algorithms are presented in
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 respectively.
3.5. Hierarchical lazy evaluation
Most of the recent black-box approaches (Chen et al., 2017;
Tu et al., 2018; Ilyas et al., 2018b) exploit the spatial regular-
ities inherent in images for query efficiency. The underlying
idea is that natural images exhibit locally regular structure
(Huang & Mumford, 1999) and is far from random matrices
of numbers. Tu et al. (2018); Ilyas et al. (2018b) exploit the
idea to estimate the gradient in blocks of pixels and perform
interpolation to compute the full gradient image.
Algorithm 4 Split Block
input Set of blocks B, Block size k
initialize B′ = ∅
1: for each block b ∈ B do
2: Split the block b into 4 blocks {b1, b2, b3, b4} with size k/2
3: B′ ← B′ ∪ {b1, b2, b3, b4}
4: end for
output B′;
Algorithm 5 Hierarchical Accelerated Local Search
input Objective set function F , Block size k, Ground set V of
size |V| = h/k×w/k× c where the image size is h×w× c
initialize Working set S = ∅
1: repeat
2: Run Local Search Algorithm on S and V using Algorithm 3
S ← LOCALSEARCH(F,S,V)
3: if k > 1 then
4: Split the blocks into finer blocks using Algorithm 4
S ← SPLITBLOCK(S, k), V ← SPLITBLOCK(V, k)
5: k ← k/2
6: end if
7: until F converges
output S;
We take a hierarchical approach and perform the acceler-
ated local search in Algorithm 3 on a coarse grid (large
blocks) and use the results to define the initial working
set in the subsequent rounds on finer grid (smaller blocks)
structure. Figure 4 illustrates the process for several rounds.
Algorithm 5 shows the overall hierarchical accelerated local
search algorithm. The ground set V now becomes the set of
all blocks, not pixels. It is important to note that most of the
attacks terminate in early stages and rarely run until the very
fine scales. Even in the case when the algorithm proceeds
into finer granularities, the algorithm pre-terminates when
it reaches the maximum allowed query limit following the
experimental protocol in Ilyas et al. (2018a;b).
4. Implementation details
We assume only the cross-entropy loss is available by model
access, following Ilyas et al. (2018a;b). On Cifar-10, We set
the initial block size to k = 4. On ImageNet, we set the ini-
tial block size to k = 32. To make blocks divisible by 2, we
set the noise size to be 256× 256 and resize it to the image
size (299×299) using nearest neighbor interpolation. Since
our method runs in query-limited setting, we fix MAXITER
(in Algorithm 3) to 1, reducing unnecessary query counts
for calculating marginal gains.
Our method needs O( |V|k2 ) queries for calculating the ini-
tial marginal gains. This can consume excessive amount
of queries before the actual perturbation. To address this,
instead of running the algorithm on the whole ground set
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Figure 4. Illustration of hierarchical lazy evaluation process. Blue area represents the blocks currently in the working set (S), while red
area represents blocks outside the working set (V \ S).
V , we split V into a partition of mini-batches {Vi}ni=1 and
split the working set S into {Si}ni=1 where Si = S ∩ Vi.
Then we update Si subject to Vi for i = 1, ..., n sequen-
tially. Concretely, at i-th step we insert elements of Vi into
Si and remove the elements from the updated Si. We fix the
mini-batch size to 64 throughout all the experiments.
5. Experiments
We evaluate the performance comparing against the NES
method (Ilyas et al., 2018a) and the Bandits method (Ilyas
et al., 2018b), which is the current state of the art in black-
box attacks, on both untargeted and targeted attack settings.
We consider the `∞ threat models on Cifar-10 and ImageNet
datasets and quantify the performance in terms of success
rate, average queries, and median queries. We further inves-
tigate the average queries on samples that NES, the weakest
attack among the baselines, successfully fooled. Note that
this is a fairer measure for evaluating an attack method’s
performance, since naïve average query measure can be af-
fected by the method’s success rate. More accurate methods
can be disadvantaged by successfully fooling more difficult
images slightly below the max query budget. We also show
the white-box PGD results from Madry et al. (2017) as the
upper bound experiment.
5.1. Experiments on Cifar-10
To evaluate the effectiveness of the method on the adversari-
ally trained network, which is known to be robust to adver-
sarial perturbations, we tested the attacks on wide Resnet
w32-10 classifier (Zagoruyko & Komodakis, 2016) adver-
sarially trained on Cifar-10 dataset (Madry et al., 2017). We
use the pretrained network provided by MadryLab2. We
then use 1,000 randomly selected images from the valida-
tion set that are initially correctly classified. We set the
maximum distortion of the adversarial image to  = 8 in
[0, 255] scale, following the experimental protocol in Madry
et al. (2017); Athalye et al. (2018); Bhagoji et al. (2018).
2https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_
challenge
We restrict the maximum number of queries to 20,000.
We run 20 iterations of PGD with constant step size of 2.0,
as done in Madry et al. (2017). We performed grid search
for hyperparameters in NES and Bandits. For NES, we
tuned σ ∈ {0.0001, 0.001, 0.01}, size of NES population
n ∈ {50, 100, 200}, learning rate η ∈ {0.001, 0.005, 0.01},
and momentum β ∈ {0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9}. For Bandits,
we tuned for OCO learning rate η ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 1, 10, 100},
image learning rate h ∈ {0.001, 0.005, 0.01}, bandit ex-
ploration δ ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 1}, and finite difference probe
η ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 1}. The hyperparameters used are listed in
supplementary B.1.
The results are presented in Table 1 and Figure 5a. We
found that our algorithm has about 10% higher success
rate than Bandits, with 33% less average queries. Notably,
this success rate is higher than the white-box PGD method.
The efficiency of our algorithm is more evident in average
queries on samples that NES successfully fooled. On this
measure, our method needs 53% less queries on average
compared to Bandits, and 91% less compared to NES.
Method Successrate
Avg.
queries
Med.
queries
Avg. queries
(NES success)
PGD (white-box) 47.2% 20 - -
NES 29.5% 2872 900 2872
Bandits 38.6% 1877 459 520
Ours 48.0% 1261 356 247
Table 1. Results for `∞ untargeted attacks on Cifar-10. Maximum
number of queries set to 20,000.
5.2. Untargeted attacks on ImageNet
On ImageNet, we attack the pretrained Inception v3 clas-
sifier from Szegedy et al. (2015) provided by Tensorflow3.
We use 10,000 randomly selected images (scaled to [0, 1])
that are initially correctly classified. We set  to 0.05 and the
maximum queries to 10,000, as done in Ilyas et al. (2018b).
3https://github.com/tensorflow/models/
tree/master/research/slim
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Figure 5. The cumulative distribution of the number of queries required for (a) untargeted attack on Cifar-10, (b) untargeted attack on
ImageNet, and (c) targeted attack on ImageNet. The dashed line indicates the success rate of white-box PGD. The results show that our
method consistently finds successful adversarial images faster than the baseline methods.
We ran PGD for 20 steps at the constant step size of 0.01.
We communicated with the authors of Ilyas et al. (2018b),
and the authors provided the up-to-date hyperparameters
for Bandits. Hyperparameters for NES were referred from
the paper. NES† and Bandits† denote the results copied
from the paper (Ilyas et al., 2018b) for comparison. The
hyperparameters used are listed in supplementary B.2.
The results are presented in Table 2 and Figure 5b. We
found that our method again outperforms other black-box
methods by a significant margin. Our method achieves about
4% higher success rate than Bandits, with 30% less queries.
Also, note that our method requires 38% less average queries
on samples that NES successfully attacked than Bandits.
Method Successrate
Avg.
queries
Med.
queries
Avg. queries
(NES success)
PGD (white-box) 99.9 % 20 - -
NES† 77.8% 1735 - 1735
NES 80.3% 1660 900 1660
Bandits† 95.4% 1117 - 703
Bandits 94.9% 1030 286 603
Ours 98.5% 722 237 376
Table 2. Results for `∞ untargeted attacks on ImageNet. Maxi-
mum number of queries set to 10,000.
5.3. Targeted attacks on ImageNet
For targeted attacks, we use the same Inception v3 network
used in the untargeted attack setting. We attack 1,000 ran-
domly selected images (scaled to [0, 1]) that are initially cor-
rectly classified. Targeted classes were chosen randomly for
each image, and each attack method chose the same target
classes for the same images for fair comparison. We limit 
to 0.05 and the maximum number of queries to 100,000.
We ran PGD for 200 steps at the constant step size of 0.001.
Hyperparameters for NES were adjusted from Ilyas et al.
(2018a) to match the results in the paper (given in supple-
mentary B.3). Since Ilyas et al. (2018b) does not report
targeted attack for Bandits, we performed hyperparameter
tuning for Bandits. We tuned for the image learning rate
h ∈ {0.0001, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05} and OCO learning
rate η ∈ {1, 10, 100, 1000}. Details of the experiment’s
results can be found in supplementary C. NES†4 indicates
the result reported in the paper (Ilyas et al., 2018a) for com-
parison. The results are presented in Table 3 and Figure 5c.
We can see that our method achieves a higher success rate
(near 100%), with about 55% less queries than NES.
Method Successrate
Avg.
queries
Med.
queries
Avg. queries
(NES success)
PGD (white-box) 100% 200 - -
NES† 99.2% - 11550 -
NES 99.7% 16284 12650 16284
Bandits 92.3% 26421 18642 26421
Ours 99.9% 7485 5373 7371
Table 3. Results for `∞ targeted attacks on ImageNet. Maximum
number of queries set to 100,000.
5.4. Untargeted attacks on ImageNet with smaller 
To evaluate the performance of our method in a more con-
strained perturbation limit, we conducted experiments on
ImageNet with the maximum perturbation  ∈ {0.01, 0.03}.
The experiments are done in the untargeted attack setting.
We restrict the maximum number of queries to be 10,000.
For NES and Bandits, which are gradient estimation based
algorithms, the hyperparameters could be sensitive to the
change of . For this reason, we re-tuned for the hy-
4In the original paper, the query limit was 1,000,000.
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Figure 6. The cumulative distribution for the number of queries
required for untargeted attack on ImageNet with  = 0.01 (left)
and  = 0.03 (right).
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Figure 7. Success rate against the average number of queries with
different hyperparameters. The square markers indicate the results
of Bandits method. The numbers at round markers show the values
of initial block size.
perparameters for these methods. For NES, we tuned
for samples per step n ∈ {50, 100, 200}, finite differ-
ence probe η ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 1}, and learning rate h ∈
{0.001, 0.005, 0.01}. For Bandits, we tuned for OCO
learning rate η ∈ {1, 10, 100}, image learning rate h ∈
{0.001, 0.005, 0.01}, bandit exploration δ ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 1},
and finite difference probe η ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 1}. The hyperpa-
rameters used are listed in supplementary B.4.
The results are shown in Table 4 and Figure 6. We can see
that, for all , our success rate is higher than the baseline
methods. The results show that the margin in the success
rate with respect to Bandits gets larger as  decreases, up to
10%, while maintaining the query efficiency lead.
Method Successrate
Avg.
queries
Med.
queries
Avg. queries
(NES success)
 = 0.01
PGD 99.5 % 20 - -
NES 48.2% 3598 3000 3598
Bandits 72.4% 2318 1374 1052
Ours 81.3% 2141 1249 852
 = 0.03
PGD 99.9 % 20 - -
NES 74.8% 2049 1200 2049
Bandits 91.3% 1382 520 774
Ours 95.9% 1129 420 537
 = 0.05
PGD 99.9 % 20 - -
NES 80.3% 1660 900 1660
Bandits 94.9% 1030 286 603
Ours 98.5% 722 237 376
Table 4. Results for `∞ untargeted attacks on ImageNet with  ∈
{0.01, 0.03, 0.05}.
5.5. Hyperparameter sensitivity
We measure the robustness of our method to hyperparam-
eters compared to Bandits. Each method’s robustness was
measured by sweeping through hyperparameters and plot-
ting their success rate and average queries, on ImageNet
untargeted attack setting. For our method, we swept the
initial block size k ∈ {32, 64, 128}. Note that k is the only
hyperparameter for our method. For Bandits, we swept
through bandit exploration δ ∈ {0.1, 1, 10}, finite differ-
ence probe η ∈ {0.01, 0.1, 1}, and tile size ∈ {25, 50, 100}.
Also note that Bandit still has two other hyperparameters,
which were left as the original setting for the experiment.
The results are shown in Figure 7. The figure shows that
the proposed method maintains a high success rate with
low variance as the hyperparameter k changes. On the
contrary, Bandits method shows relatively higher variance
in both success rate and average queries. In our opinion,
gradient estimation based methods, in general, are sensitive
to the first order update hyperparameter settings as the ascent
direction is approximated under limited query budget.
6. Conclusion
Motivated by the observation that finding an adversarial
perturbation can be viewed as computing solutions of linear
programs under bounded feasible set, we have developed a
discrete surrogate problem for practical black-box adversar-
ial attacks. In contrast to the current state of the art methods,
our method does not require estimating the gradient vector
and thus becomes free of the update hyperparameters. Our
experiments show the state of the art attack success rate at
significantly lower average/median/NES_success queries on
both untargeted and targeted attacks on neural networks.
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A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 2. Let S be the solution obtained by performing
the local search algorithm. Then S is a local optima.
Proof. Suppose S is not a local optima, then there exists
an element x that satisfies one of the followings: x ∈
S and F (S\{x}) ≥ F (S) or x ∈ V\S and F (S∪{x}) ≥
F (S). This means the algorithm must not terminate with S .
Contradiction.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 1
Before proving Theorem 1, we introduce submodularity in-
dex (SmI) which is a measure of the degree of submodularity
(Zhou & Spanos, 2016).
Definition 7. The submodularity index (Zhou & Spanos,
2016) for a set function F : 2V → R, a set L, and a
cardinality k is defined as
λF (L, k) = minA⊆L
S∩A=∅
|S|≤k
{
φF (S,A) ,
∑
x∈S
Fx(A)− FS(A)
}
,
where FS(A) = F (A ∪ S)− F (A).
It is easy to verify ∀I ⊆ J , SmI satisfies λF (I, k) ≥
λF (J , k) and for the optimal solution C, −2F (C) ≤
λF (V, 2) ≤ 2F (C). Following lemma bounds the degrada-
tion in submodularity with SmI.
Lemma 3. LetA be an arbitrary set, B = A∪{y1, ..., yM}
and x ∈ B. Then, Fx(A)− Fx(B) ≥MλF (B, 2)
Proof. See Zhou & Spanos (2016) Lemma 3.
Lemma 4. Let Y be an arbitrary set and A ⊆ B, Then
F (A∪Y)− F (A)
≥ F (B ∪ Y)− F (B) + |B \ A| · |Y| · λF (B ∪ Y, 2)
Proof. Let Y = {a1, ..., an}. Then,
F (A ∪ {a1})− F (A)
≥ F (B ∪ {a1})− F (B) + |B \ A|λF (B, 2)
F (A ∪ {a1, a2})− F (A ∪ {a1})
≥ F (B ∪ {a1, a2})− F (B ∪ {a1})
+ |B \ A|λF (B ∪ {a1}, 2)
...
F (A ∪ Y)− F (A ∪ Y \ {an})
≥ F (B ∪ Y)− F (B ∪ Y \ {an})
+ |B \ A|λF (B ∪ Y \ {an}, 2)
By telescoping sum,
F (A ∪ Y)− F (A)
≥ F (B ∪ Y)− F (B) + |B \ A|
n∑
i=1
λF (B ∪ {a1, ...ai−1}, 2)
≥ F (B ∪ Y)− F (B) + |B \ A| · |Y| · λF (B ∪ Y, 2)
(By property of SmI)
Next lemma relates the local optima solution from local
search with submodularity index.
Lemma 5. If S is a local optima for a function F, then for
any subsets I ⊆ S ⊆ J , the following holds.
F (I) ≤ F (S)−
(
|S \ I|
2
)
λF (S, 2)
F (J ) ≤ F (S)−
(
|J \ S|
2
)
λF (J , 2)
Proof. Let I = T0 ⊆ T1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Tk = S be a chain of
sets where Ti \ Ti−1 = {ai}. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the
following holds.
F (Ti)− F (Ti−1) ≥ F (S)− F (S \ {ai}) + (k − i)λF (S \ {ai}, 2)
(By Lemma 3)
≥ (k − i)λF (S \ {ai}, 2)
(By the definition of local optima)
≥ (k − i)λF (S, 2)
(By the property of SmI)
By telescoping sum,
F (S)− F (I) ≥
k∑
i=1
(k − i)λF (S, 2) =
(
|S \ I|
2
)
λF (S, 2)
Similarly, Let S = T0 ⊆ T1 ⊆ · · · ⊆ Tk = J be a chain
of sets where Ti \ Ti−1 = {ai}. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the
following holds.
F (Ti)− F (Ti−1) ≤ F (S ∪ {ai})− F (S)− (i− 1)λF (Ti−1, 2)
(By Lemma 3)
≤ −(i− 1)λF (Ti−1, 2)
(By the definition of local optima)
≤ −(i− 1)λF (J , 2)
(By the property of SmI)
By telescoping sum,
F (J )− F (S) ≤ −
k∑
i=1
(i− 1)λF (J , 2)
= −
(
|J \ S|
2
)
λF (J , 2)
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Now, we prove Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Let C be an optimal solution for a function F
and S be the solution obtained by the local search algorithm.
Then,
2F (S) + F (V \ S) ≥ F (C) + ξλF (V, 2),
where
ξ =
(
|S \ C|
2
)
+
(
|C \ S|
2
)
+ |S ∪ C| · |S|+ |C \ S| · |S ∩ C|
Proof. Since S is a local optimum, The following holds by
Lemma 5.
F (S) ≥ F (S ∩ C) +
(|S \ C|
2
)
λF (S, 2)
F (S) ≥ F (S ∪ C) +
(|C \ S|
2
)
λF (S ∪ C, 2)
Also from Lemma 4, we have,
F (S ∪ C) + F (V \ S)
≥ F (C \ S) + F (V) + |S ∪ C| · |S| · λF (V, 2)
≥ F (C \ S) + |S ∪ C| · |S| · λF (V, 2)
(By non-negativity)
Also,
F (S ∩ C) + F (C \ S)
≥ F (C) + F (∅) + |C \ S| · |S ∩ C| · λF (C, 2)
≥ F (C) + |C \ S| · |S ∩ C| · λF (C, 2)
(By non-negativity)
Summing the inequalities, we get
2F (S) + F (V \ S) ≥ F (C)+
(|S \ C|
2
)
λF (S, 2)
+
(|C \ S|
2
)
λF (S ∪ C, 2)
+|S ∪ C| · |S| · λF (V, 2)
+|C \ S| · |S ∩ C| · λF (C, 2)
Since all λF (·, 2)’s are greater than or equal to λF (V, 2) by
the property of SmI, we get
2F (S) + F (V \ S) ≥ F (C) +
[(|S \ C|
2
)
+
(|C \ S|
2
)
+ |S ∪ C| · |S|+ |C \ S| · |S ∩ C|
]
λF (V, 2)
= F (C) + ξλF (V, 2)
B. Hyperparameters
B.1. Experiments on Cifar-10
Hyperparameters for NES and Bandits on Cifar-10 dataset
in untargeted setting are shown in Table 5 and Table 6 re-
spectively. Note that the hyperparameters are tuned in a
setting where images are normalized in a scale of [0, 1] to
maintain consistency with the experiments on ImageNet
dataset.
Hyperparameter Value
σ for NES 0.001
n, size of each NES population 100
η, learning rate 0.01
β, momentum 0.9
Table 5. Hyperparameters for NES untargeted attack on Cifar-10.
Hyperparameter Value
η, OCO learning rate 0.1
h, image learning rate 0.01
δ, bandit exploration 0.1
η, finite difference probe 0.1
tile size 16
Table 6. Hyperparameters for Bandits untargeted attack on Cifar-
10.
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B.2. Untargeted attacks on ImageNet
Hyperparameters for NES and Bandits on ImageNet dataset
in untargeted setting are listed in Table 7 and Table 8. We
use NES implementation from Ilyas et al. (2018b), since
Ilyas et al. (2018a) conducted experiments only in the tar-
geted setting.
Hyperparameter Value
n, sample per step 100
η, finite difference probe 0.1
h, image learning rate 0.01
Table 7. Hyperparameters for NES untargeted attack on ImageNet.
Hyperparameter Value
η, OCO learning rate 100
h, image learning rate 0.01
δ, bandit exploration 1.0
η, finite difference probe 0.1
tile size 50
Table 8. Hyperparameters for Bandits untargeted attack on Ima-
geNet.
B.3. Targeted attacks on ImageNet
Hyperparameters for NES targeted attack on ImageNet
dataset are shown in Table 9. All the hyperparameters ex-
cept for momentum are referred from the original paper.
For momentum, we tuned with range β ∈ {0.5, 0.7, 0.9}.
The result of tuning momentum is in Table 10. We choose
β = 0.7 which records the lowest average queries.
Hyperparameter Value
σ for NES 0.001
n, size of each NES population 50
η, learning rate 0.01
β, momentum 0.7
Table 9. Hyperparameters for NES targeted attack on ImageNet.
Momentum Successrate
Avg.
queries
Med.
queries
0.5 99.2% 16977 13375
0.7 99.7% 16284 12650
0.9 99.8% 16725 13525
Table 10. Result of tuning momentum for NES.
B.4. Untargeted attacks on ImageNet with smaller 
Hyperparameters for NES and Bandit with smaller maxi-
mum perturbation are given in Table 11 and Table 12. Since
we run the experiments in untargeted setting, we use NES
implementation from Ilyas et al. (2018b).
Hyperparameter Value
 = 0.01  = 0.03
n, samples per step 100 100
η, finite difference probe 1 1
h, image learning rate 0.001 0.005
Table 11. Hyperparameters for NES untargeted attack on ImageNet
with smaller .
Hyperparameter Value
 = 0.01  = 0.03
η, OCO learning rate 100 100
h, image learning rate 0.001 0.005
δ, bandit exploration 0.1 1
η, finite difference probe 1 1
tile size 50 50
Table 12. Hyperparameters for Bandits untargeted attack on Ima-
geNet with smaller .
C. Tuning Bandits for targeted attack
In applying Bandits to targeted attack, we tuned for image
learning rate h and OCO learning rate η. Other hyperpa-
rameters were set as the untargeted setting given by the
authors. We performed grid search on the two hyperparam-
eters, with range h ∈ {0.0001, 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05}
and η ∈ {1, 10, 100, 1000}. This sweep range covers the
method’s original untargeted setting, which is h = 0.01 and
η = 100. Evaluation metrics were attack success rate and
average queries. Results can be found below.
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Figure 8. Success rate with given hyperparameters.
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Figure 9. Average queries with given hyperparameters.
On the paper’s Table 3 we used h = 0.001 and η = 1,
which shows the best result on success rate with low average
queries.
D. Additional plot on hyperparameter
sensitivity analysis
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Figure 10. Mean and standard deviation plots of success rate
against the number of queries across different hyperparamters.
The solid lines show the average success rate (y-axis) at each query
limit (x-axis).
To show the robustness of our method to hyperparameters
more explicitly, we draw a mean and standard deviation plot
of success rate against the number of queries across different
hyperparameter settings for each attack method. The exper-
imental protocol is the same as in Section 5.5 in the main
text. The results are shown in Figure 10. The figure shows
that our method is less sensitive to the hyperparameters than
Bandits at every query limit.
